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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WILMA R. BUGGER,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 940394-CA
vs.
CHARLES B. BUGGER,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CHARLES B. BUGGER
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant brings this appeal from the decision of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i)
(1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err, as a matter of Law, in entering

the June 1994 Decree of Annulment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law "Nunc Pro Tunc"? (R 133-36)
Determining whether the doctrine of Nunc Pro Tunc was properly
applied is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Matter of Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973 (Utah App. 1993).

2.

Did the lower court err, as a matter of Law, in setting

aside Appellant's Amended Decree of Annulment, entered on or about
July 22, 1993? (R 181-86)
Issues of Law are subject to de novo review by a
appellate court, and the court gives no deference to the trial
court's conclusions of law*

Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State. 779

P*2d 634 (Utah 1989).
3.

Did the lower court err, as a factual finding, in

concluding there was "good cause" for a Decree of Annulment to be
entered Nunc Pro Tunc in this matter? (R 133-36)
4.

Did the lower court err, as a factual finding, in

concluding the Respondent did not intentionally and willfully
disregard Judge Conder's ruling in the 1983 proceedings? (R 239-42)
A finding of fact will be adjudged clearly erroneous if
it violates appellate court standards, is inconsistent with the
clear weight of the evidence, or, the reviewing court is "left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"
even though there is evidence to support the finding. Cumminas v.
Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).

Issues of fact may be

reversed on appeal if they are found to be clearly erroneous.
Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provision is controlling in this
action:
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Utah Code Ann. S 30-4a-l (1983)
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good
cause and giving of such notice as may he ordered, enter an
order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage , divorce ,
legal separation or annulment of marriage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a)

Nature of the case.
This appeal

is from entry of a domestic

relations

ORDER

PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND RELATED RELIEF AND
DISCHARGE OF LIEN CLAIM, and the corresponding DECREE OF ANNULMENT
(ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC), entered by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley,
Judge for Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
(b)

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
In January of 1946, Respondent, Wilma R. Bugger (hereinafter

"Wilma"), was awarded a Decree of Divorce that was to become
absolute and final in July of 1946.

However, in June of 1946,

Wilma married Appellant, Charles B. Bugger (hereinafter "Charles"),
in Las Vegas, Nevada.
On or about the 13th day of May, 1982, Wilma was awarded a
Decree of Divorce from Charles, by default, from the Third Judicial
District Court.

Charles subsequently filed a Motion to Set Aside

the default Decree.
On the

19th day

of April, 1983, following

a hearing

on

Charles' motion and his proposed Counterclaim for Annulment, the
previous Decree of Divorce was set aside and the parties were
3

awarded a Decree of Annulment, to become final upon entry by the
Court.

Although

Wilma's

counsel was

obliged

to

draft

the

documents, the final Decree of Annulment and accompanying Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were never provided for entry by the
court.
On or about April 13, 1993, the parties' final Decree of
Annulment was ultimately entered, along with the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, all of which had been prepared from the
transcript of the April 19, 1983, hearing.

On or about July 22,

1993, these documents were Amended to include a legal description
of the real property involved in the matter but were otherwise
unchanged from the April 1993 documents.
Subsequent to entry of the Amended Decree of Annulment in July
of 1993, an Order to Show Cause action against was filed, which was
followed by a counter-motion to set aside the Amended Decree of
Annulment. On the 1st day of March, 1994, the matter was certified
for a hearing in front of a District Court Judge.
On the 19th day of April, 1994, the 1993 Decree(s) of
Annulment, the Findings of Fact, and the Conclusions of Law were
set aside.

Wilma's counsel was again ordered to prepare a new

Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, which were to be based upon the transcript of the 1983 hearing
and were to be entered Nunc Pro Tunc.
On or about the 3rd day of June, 1994, Wilma's version of the
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

4

were entered Nunc Pro Tunc, even though these documents did not
conform to the transcript of the 1983 ruling. Charles timely filed
his appeal on this matter on or about the 30th day of June, 1994.
(c) Statement of Material Facts.
On or about January 21, 1946, Wilma was granted a divorce from
a prior husband, with the provision that this Decree of Divorce
would not become absolute and final until the expiration of six (6)
months from the date the Decree was entered, roughly July 21, 1946.
Notwithstanding Wilma* s knowledge of the continuing validity of her
marriage to her former husband, on or about June 10, 1946, and
without Charles' knowledge of the divorce provision, Wilma entered
into a marriage relationship with Charles.
In or around October of 1981, Wilma filed a divorce action
against Charles, which was granted in May of 1982 by way of the
court's entry of Charles' default.

It was during the course of

these proceedings that Charles learned that Wilma's prior marriage
had not been legally dissolved prior to her marriage to Charles and
a Motion to Set Aside the Default and proposed counterclaim for
annulment was filed.
On April 19th of 1983, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District
Court Judge, presided over a hearing on the matter. At the close
of this hearing, Judge Conder entered his oral findings for the
record wherein he stated the Decree would be final upon his
signature and entry by the court. In order to achieve an equitable
property distribution in this complex situation, Judge Conder
5

basically took the position that he would do the best he could
under the circumstances•
Wilma was awarded the marital residence, with the direction
that upon Judge Conder's signing of the final Decree of Annulment,
Wilma had six (6) months to pay Charles $9,826-00, the balance of
his equity in the property distribution scheme.

Among the other

provisions of Judge Conder's oral ruling was an award of a mobile
home to Charles, which Judge Conder valued at $7,000.00 for equity
distribution purposes (Wilma herself had described the same mobile
home as "very old" in financial declarations filed in both 1982 and
1983).

Charles was also awarded a $79.11 per month equity

payment on a uniform real estate contract that had roughly nine
more years to run.
Wilma•s counsel failed to submit the final Decree of Annulment
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Charles' approval
and entry by the Court upon Judge Conder's signature.

However,

pursuant to the 1983 ruling, Wilma made the monthly payments on the
uniform real estate contract, until it ran out in roughly April of
1992, but Wilma never did pay Charles the $9,826.00 she was ordered
to pay for the balance of his equity interest in the marital
property.

Of course, Wilma's attorney never did submit the final

Decree of Annulment for Judge Conder's signature so as to start the
six month time frame from which Wilma*s payment obligation would
start to run, so it appeared there was no legal obligation for
Wilma to make this payment.
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In or around the summer of 1992, Charles learned that Wilma
had sold the very mobile home that had been awarded to Charles in
1983. Wilma had neither the authority nor the consent to sell the
mobile home, but she sold it nonetheless for approximately $500.00.
Upon

learning

of

WilmaBs

unauthorized

disposal

of Charles'

property, Charles sought the advice of an attorney who ultimately
discovered that there had never been a Decree of Annulment entered
by the court*
Following the attorney's direction, Charles tracked down the
Court Reporter that worked with Judge Conder in 1983 and had Judge
Conder's oral rulings transcribed.
services

of Loreen

Poff

to assist

Charles then retained the
in generating,

from

the

transcript, the Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
In April of 1993, without the assistance of counsel, Charles
submitted the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
the final Decree of Annulment to Judge Medley, along with a
photocopy of the transcripts upon which the documents were based.
Judge Medley reviewed the transcript and determined the documents
were consistent with Judge Conder's rulings and Judge Medley
therefore signed the documents and they were entered by the court.
During this time period, Wilma was serving a mission for the
L.D.S. church; she was not present in the State of Utah; and Wilma
did not receive advance notice of Charles* Pro Se and ex-parte
filings. Shortly after the court entered the Decree of Annulment,
7

in July of 1993 and still during Wilma*s service for her churchf
Charles learned it was appropriate to include a legal description
of real property in marriage dissolution documents so, still
without the services of counsel and without notice to Wilma,
Charles had the documents amended to include the legal description
of the real property involved.

Judge Medley again reviewed the

documents and, determining that the legal description amendment did
not change the substance of Judge Conder's 1983 ruling, Judge
Medley signed and entered the Amended documents on July 22, 1993.
Following Wilma*s return to the State of Utah, sometime around
August of 1993, Charles filed a pro se Order to Show Cause against
Wilma regarding her failure to pay Charles the equity he had been
awarded in 1983 and Wilma8s unauthorized and unilateral sale of his
property, the mobile home.

Charles prosecuted his Order to Show

Cause pro se until Commissioner Atherton of the Third Judicial
District Court entered her recommendation against Charles on or
about the 1st day of March, 1994, and certified the matter for a
hearing in front of Judge Medley.

At that point in time, Charles

again sought the assistance of counsel.
On the 19th day of April, 1994, the matter came back before
Judge Medley on Charles' Order to Show Cause and on Wilma's Motion
for Relief from the Orders of the Court.

During this hearing,

Judge Medley ruled (1) the final Decree of Annulment, Findings of
Fact, and the Conclusions of Law were never entered by Judge Conder
in 1983 or at any time thereafter; (2) that even though Judge
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Medley personally reviewed the transcript and verified it was
consistent with Charles1 proposed documents, Judge Medley set aside
the Amended Decree of Annulment for lack of "notice" to Wilma; (3)
there was no willful disregard for Judge Conder's 1983 rulings; (4)
each party was now precluded from remedy by reason of laches,
inasmuch as the Decree was to be entered nunc pro tunc; (5) and
Charles was ordered to remove his lien upon the residential
property of Wilma in light of the no remedy ruling.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, it is entirely inappropriate for a trial court
to enter an Order nunc pro tunc when the delay in rendering the
final Decree or Judgment is based upon the negligence or failure of
one of the parties to the action.

Nunc pro tunc Orders are

appropriate only when it is established that the delay was caused
by circumstances and/or events entirely beyond the control of the
parties to the action•
In the present case, the delay in entering the final Decree
was directly caused by the failure of a party to follow through
with their obligation - the final Decree was simply never submitted
to the court.

Therefore, a Decree of Annulment entered Nunc Pro

Tunc in the present case was plain error and should be set aside.
Also, the lower court's determination that there was no
willful disregard of Judge Conder's
erroneous when the record

1983 ruling was clearly

shows Wilma clearly

knew

she was

obligated to pay Charles $9,826.00 within six months of the
9

Annulment or put the marital residence up for sale*

Charles did

not receive the $9,826.00 and the home was never placed on the
market for sale.

This is clear evidence of willful and knowing

disregard for the orders of the court.
An additional err occurred when the lower court set aside the
July 1993 Amended Decree of Annulment, based upon the court's
conclusion that Wilma did not receive her constitutional or
statutory

right

to

"notice" before

the

Decree was

entered.

Inasmuch as the Amended Decree of Annulment entered in July of 1993
was prepared directly from the transcript of Judge Conder's oral
rulings in 1983, Wilma had already received full, complete, and
actual "notice" of the contents of the final Decree of Annulment
when she voluntarily participated in the 1983 proceedings.
Finally, it is equally obvious that the 1994 documents entered
by the lower court, nunc pro tunc, were not based upon the
transcript of Judge Conder's ruling, as was ordered by Judge Medley
in April of 1994. The 1994 Decree of Annulment and the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law are clearly taken from the documents
that were alleged to have been generated by Wilma's counsel in
1983. The 1994 documents contain several findings and conclusions
that appear nowhere within the transcript, not to mention wording
that is inconsistent with the transcript but almost identical to
the language found in the alleged 1983 documents.

Judge Medley

ordered that documents be prepared consistent with the transcript;
Judge Medley did not recognize the validity of the alleged 1983
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documentation; it is therefore plain error for the lower court to
have accepted and entered documentation inconsistent with that
which

was

ordered

and

the

1994

nunc

pro

tunc

Decree

and

accompanying documentation should therefore be set aside.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT MISUSED ITS NUNC PRO TUNC POWER WHEN IT
APPLIED THIS PROCESS TO THE JUNE 1994 DECREE OF ANNULMENT.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1994), the trial court

may enter an Order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to the
annulment of marriage IF the court finds "good cause" for such an
entry.

The definition and/or meaning of "good cause" hinges upon

the particular facts of a case and therefore "must be determined on
a case by case basis . . •"

Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248

(Utah App. 1987). Additionally, the legislative foundation of the
nunc pro tunc power was to at least attempt to avoid "obvious
injustices" that would result without such authority.

Id.

The

facts involved in the present case are inconsistent with the
position that there is "good cause" for use of the nunc pro tunc
power or that "obvious injustices" would result if the power were
not applied.
A.

There Simply Is Not Enough Legal Or Factual Support In
This Case To Establish "Good Cause" For Use Of The Lower
Court's Nunc Pro Tunc Power.

Generally speaking, courts applying the nunc pro tunc power
have been upheld on appeal under circumstances where one of the
parties to the action has died after the matter was submitted to
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the court for a decision, but prior to the court actually rendering
its decision, or, when a decision has actually been rendered by the
court but through no fault of the parties, the court itself has
failed to properly record the decision.

See, e.g», Baashaw v.

Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990).
Neither of the parties in the present case have died, which
leaves the second category as the generally accepted grounds for
use of the nunc pro tunc power. Quoting from Mitchell v. Overman,
103 U.S. 62, 26 L.Ede 369 (1881), this Court stated as follows:
The second category is based upon the principle that "where
the delay in rendering judgment or decree arises from the
act of the court, that is, where the delay has been for its
convenience, or has been caused by the multiplicity or
press of business or the intricacy of the questions
involved, or of any other cause not attributable to the
laches of the parties, but within the control of the court;
the judgment or the decree may be entered retrospectively."
Baashaw, 788 P.2d

at 1060-61.

(Emphasis in original).

In

reviewing the facts of its case, the Baashaw Court commented
These general principles of the common law of nunc pro tunc
are relevant, if not controlling, in a determination of good
cause under section 30-4a-l. In this case, the court did not
make the clerical error, but taking the facts in the light
most favorable to the Husband, Husband did. It is undisputed
that the court never received the written stipulation
mentioned in the minute entry. Thus, this alone could support
a finding of lack of "good cause" under section 30-4a-l.
788 P.2d at 1061.
As in the Baashaw case, the 1983 court in the present case did
not make any clerical errors, but taking the facts in the light
most favorable to Wilma, Wilma did. It was Wilma's responsibility,
through counsel, to draft the Decree of Annulment, get it approved
12

as to form, signed by Judge Conder and ultimately entered by the
court.

It is undisputed that Judge Conder never signed the final

Decree of Annulment because it was never submitted for his review.
Just as was found in the Bagshaw case, this alone could support a
finding of lack of "good cause" under section 30-4a-l.

Whether

viewed as a factual matter or an issue of law, there is no "good
cause" support for the nunc pro tunc ruling and it should be set
aside.
B*

Even Assuming "Good Cause" Is Supportable In The Present Case,
The June 1994 Decree And The Accompanying Documents Were Not
Consistent With The Only Actual Record Of The 1983 Ruling And
Therefore The 1994 Documentation Does Not Meet The Nunc Pro
Tunc Requirements.
In Preece v. Preece, the Utah Supreme Court stated "the

function of a nunc pro tunc order is not to make an order now for
then, but to enter now for then an order previously made." 682 P.2d
298, 299 (Utah 1984). The Court further stated that "nunc pro tunc
is used to make the record speak the truth; it may not be used to
correct the court's failure to speak."

Id.

In the present case, the only absolute record available which
reveals what was actually ordered by Judge Conder in 1983 is the
transcript, which is the best possible source of information
available. Unfortunately, the Decree of Annulment entered nunc pro
tunc in June of 1994, as well as the documents accompanying the
Decree, reveals several serious inconsistencies when compared to
the

transcript;

although

the

1994

documents

are

extremely

consistent with the documentation allegedly prepared in 1983 by
13

Wilma's prior legal representative.
In light of the fact that Wilma's counsel was ordered in 1994
to prepare a Decree, Findings, and Conclusions that were consistent
with the transcript, and inasmuch as the final product was an
obvious disregard for that order and clearly covers issues and
matters found nowhere within the transcript, the 1994 Decree of
Annulment, entered nunc pro tunc, was plain and clear error.

A

document that does not reflect the actual order previously entered
does not satisfy the requirements for use of the nunc pro tunc
power. By using the power inappropriately, as in the present case,
the very injustice that the power was meant to avoid was in fact
generated. The 1994 documentation simply has no support under the
nunc pro tunc criteria and, as a matter of law, the nunc pro tunc
ruling should be set aside.
C.

"Good Cause" Determinations Must Include A Consideration
Of Good Faith Dealings And Wilma Knowingly And Willfully
Disregarded Judge Conder's 1983 Orders Regarding The
Property Distribution And Equity Equalization.

In defining "good cause" for nunc pro tunc purposes, it is
important for the court to consider all factors that relate to
methods of avoiding "obvious injustices" that could result from the
inappropriate use of the nunc pro tunc power. See, Home, 737 P.2d
at 248.

In the present case, Wilma's willful, knowing, and

intentional disregard for Judge Conder's 1983 order shows conduct
that would create an "obvious injustice" if she is allowed to avoid
court ordered liability because of a failure on the part of her own
14

legal representative.

Under the circumstances of this case,

leaving the nunc pro tunc order in place presents just such an
injustice*
Wilma claims she received a copy of the Decree of Annulment
from her attorney in 1983. The alleged Decree of Annulment clearly
states Wilma was to pay Charles $9,000.00 plus within 180 days or
she was ordered to place the home on the real estate market for
immediate sale. Wilma also states that she assumed the Decree of
Annulment had been signed and entered by the court; thus Wilma was
under the impression that the Decree was a valid and legal order of
the court.

Assuming this to be true, Wilma's failure to pay

Charles the $9,000.00 plus within six months of the 1983 hearing
date, and her failure to place the house on the market for sale
following that six month period, is clear and indisputable evidence
of a willful and knowing disregard for Judge Conder's order.
It would be entirely inappropriate and creates an obvious
injustice if Wilma is now entitled to escape liability under Judge
Conder's orders based on her own legal representative's failure to
carry out his obligations and the nunc pro tunc orders now in
place; especially in light of Wilma's admissions that she has
already knowingly, intentionally, and wrongfully sold property that
she knew was awarded to Charles in 1983. All documents filed in
June of 1994, and entered nunc pro tunc, should be set aside as an
abuse of discretion by the lower court and clearly inappropriate
under the circumstances and undisputable facts of this case.
15
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WILMA'S PERSONAL AND FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF JUDGE CONDER'S
RULING IN 1983 CONSTITUTES "ACTUAL" NOTICE, THEREBY PRECLUDING
WILMA'S CLAIMS OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AND/OR PREJUDICE.
The 14 th amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as

Article I of the Utah Constitution, impose procedural due process
restrictions

on

the power

of

individuals or their property.

government

to proceed

against

At the heart of the due process

clause is the implicit guarantee that an individual has the right
to have an opportunity to appear and defend against any action
which may deprive the individual of property or liberty.

In the

case at hand, Wilma cannot make a valid Due Process argument.
In Graham v. Sawaya, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the
due process clause requires "notice to a party before his or her
rights are affected by a judgment." 632 P.2d 851, 853 (1981).
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2nd. 1207, 1211

(Utah

1983).

The

1993

proceedings for which Wilma complains of a lack of notice, thereby
violating her Due Process rights, is not a new proceeding for
judgment, nor an appeal of a proceeding's judgment, but was the
mere filing of the documentation based upon and consistent with the
transcripts of the original proceeding, which Wilma took part in.
As a party to the original proceeding, Wilma received fair and
sufficient notice, was given ample opportunity to be heard, and to
prepare for the defense of her person, position and property.
Wilma

is

therefore

charged

with
16

"actual"

notice

of

that

proceeding's judgment and there is no Due Process violation based
upon the entry of that judgment without notice in 1993.
As stated by the Court in Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., a
"person is deemed to have 'constructive notice' when he is in
possession of all the relevant facts and circumstances." 806 P.2d
503, 508 (Mont. 1991). Wilma was not only a party in the original
proceeding

and

therefore

had

"all

the

relevant

facts

and

circumstances, " Wilma*s counsel was given the responsibility for
drafting and filing the final Decree of Annulment, the Findings of
Fact, and the Conclusions of Law. Wilma1 s counsel may have failed
to file the documents with the court, but Wilma still had full
knowledge of the contents of Judge Conder's ruling.

Thus, Wilma

was not deprived of her Due Process rights in 1993 on the grounds
of inadequate notice when Judge Medley entered the Decree of
Annulment consistent with the transcript of Judge Conder's ruling
in 1983. The Amended Decree of Annulment entered in July of 1993
should not have been set aside.
While Charles has the burden of establishing Wilma's knowledge
by clear and convincing evidence, such evidence is a matter of
record in the present case.

Thus, actual notice precludes Wilma

from complaining of prejudice for failure to receive statutory
notice.
III. WITHOUT ESTABLISHING A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION, THE LOWER COURT
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE THE 1993 AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT.
Under The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "Findings of fact,
17

whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous . e ." Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are

against the clear weight of evidence or if the court is convinced
that a mistake has been made.
159 (Utah App. 1989).

Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156,

In order to successfully challenge a trial

courtBs findings, all the relevant evidence presented at the
proceeding must be marshalled and a demonstration made as to why
the findings are clearly erroneous.
P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990).

Cornish Town v. Roller, 798

Therefore, unless Wilma can show that

the Findings of Fact based upon the documentary evidence, the
transcript, are clearly erroneous, there is simply no legal basis
for setting aside the Findings and Decree entered in 1993.
In addition, where the parties have been afforded a trial, the
Court in Hall v. Blackman stated that a presumption arises that the
judgment should not be disturbed unless the one attacking the
judgment can meet the requirement of showing that the error is
substantial and prejudicial. 417 P.2d 664 (Utah 1966).

Under the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 states that "The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."

In Workman v. Nagle Const. Co., this Court held that

although the prevailing party may fail to notify the opponents of
entry

of

judgment, this failure does not make the

judgment

ineffective, but is rather harmless error. 802 P.2d 749, 750 - 751
18

(Utah App. 1990).

Therefore, until Wilma can show that the

original judgment or the Findings of Fact based on the transcript
of the original proceeding has substantial and prejudicial error,
the judgments should not be disturbed or ruled as void.
Absent the establishment of a Due Process claim, Charles
should prevail on this appeal.

Wilma, a party to the original

judicial proceeding, is charged with knowledge of that proceeding
and all ruling generated by that proceeding. Thus, since knowledge
is held to be a form of actual notice, unless Wilma can provide a
clear showing of substantial and prejudicial error, the Findings of
Fact based on the original transcript of the judgment should not be
set aside. Wilma simply cannot support her claim of prejudice for
Charles' failure to provide notice in 1993. While Charles has the
burden of establishing Wilma's knowledge by clear and convincing
evidence, such evidence is a matter of record* Therefore, without
a showing of harm, substantial and prejudicial error, or a due
process violation, the lower court should not have set aside the
1993 Decree of Annulment for failure to provide notice.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's power to enter orders nunc pro tunc is
strictly regulated and reviewed under appellate standards that
preclude its use in circumstances where the negligence of one of
the parties to the action causes the delay in entering the judgment
or Decree.

It was Wilma's failure if it was anyone's that caused

the delay in the entry of Judge Conder's ruling and therefore a
19

nunc pro tunc order is inappropriate and should be set aside.
Also, nunc pro tunc orders are not appropriate when the
judgment or Decree is not consistent with the actual orders of the
previous court, nor is it appropriate when its application would
cause the very injustices it was meant to avoid.

In the present

case, the nunc pro tunc orders discuss issues found not in the
transcript but in the prior documents that were rejected by the
court.

Terminology used in the nunc pro tunc orders match the

language used in the rejected documents, but are inconsistent with
the transcript of the 1983 hearing. By allowing the nunc pro tunc
order to stand, Wilma avoids any and all liability for failing to
abide by the court's orders, which is an obvious injustice.
Finally, the 1993 Decree and Findings were based upon, and
totally consistent with, Judge Conder's actual orders in 1983. In
light of the fact these documents were based upon indisputable
documentary evidence, which Wilma had complete and actual knowledge
of, Wilma had actual "notice" of the 1993 Decree and Findings. The
1993 documents entered by Judge Medley should not have been set
aside and in doing so, the lower court abused its discretion.
Based

on

the

foregoing

facts

and

arguments,

Charles

respectfully asks this Court to overturn the trial court and set
aside the 1994 Decree of Annulment (Entered Nunc Pro Tunc) and
reinstate the Amended Decree of Annulment entered by the trial
court in July of 1993.
fairness, Charles

Further, in the interests of justice and

respectfully
20

requests

that

this Court

not

institute the six (6) month time period in which Wilma must pay
Charles the balance of his equity distribution interest until such
time as this Court announces its decision, notwithstanding the
entry of the Decree in July of 1993.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7f#dav of March, 1995.

GARY L. BELL
124 South 400 East, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
Charles B. Bugger
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT were hand-delivered or mailed,
postage prepaid, to W. Kevin Jackson, Attorney for Respondent, at
311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379,
on this /7f#

day of March, 1995.
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ADDENDUM:

TRANSCRIPT OF 1983 HEARING, JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER PRESIDING
(Transcription date March 21, 1992)
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Entered July 22, 1993)
AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT
(Entered July 22, 1993)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC)
(Entered June 3, 1994)
DECREE OF ANNULMENT (ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC)
(Entered June 3, 1994)
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CERT

IP

I C A T E

I
2

STATE OP UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SAIff XAKEj

, _
88.

4
5
6

X, Hal K. W a l t o n , do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I am

7

a C e r t i f i e d S h o r t h a n d R e p o r t e r o f t h e S t a t e of U t a h ; t h a t on

8

A p r i l 1 9 , 1983 I a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e above-named Court and

9

r e p o r t e d i n S t e n o t y p e t h e Order h e r e i n a t t a c h e d c o n s i s t i n g

10

of t e n p a g e s .

T n a t t h e sanfe* i s a t r u e and c o r r e c t r e n d i t i o n

It

of my s h o r t h a n d M i o t e s a s t r a n s c r i b e d by me.

12
13
14

fc

15

cr£

H.M. Walton C.S.R.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Datedt

March 21«t/ 1992

r~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE„QFrtUTAH
OOOOQOOODOOOOOO

2
3

WILMA R. BUGGER,
Plaintiff,

D-81-4371

4
5

v.

J U D G E ' S
7

ORDER

CHARLES B. BUGGER,
Defendant.

8
9

BE IT REMEMBERED, t h a t t h e a b o v e - c a p t i o n e d c a u s e o f

10
II

a c t i o n came on r e g u l a r l y f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HONORABLE

12

DEAN E". CONDER, one o f t h e Judges o f t h e above-named Court on

13

April 19th,

1983.

14

A

P P E A R A N C E S

IS
16

For t h e

Plaintiffs

MR. KENN M.HANSEN
A t t o r n e y A t Law 740 E. 3900 S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , Uta&

For t h e

Defendant:

MR. HORACE J . KNOWLTON
A t t o r n e y . At Law
2 1 4 Tenth Avenue
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a i

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1

THE COURTs

It's the Judgement of this Court that

2

the parties be granted a Decree of Anullment;and I think that]

3

the law provides that whatever property has been acquired by

4

the parties during their marriage should be equally divided

5

between them. And it's my feeling that marriage is a partnei

6

-shiprand as much as possible should share in the profits an4

7

share in the losses.

8
9
10
11

I find that there is an equity in the home of thirty^
three-thousand-six hundred-thirty dollars*

Going to award

the home to the Plaintiff herein.
I find that there is an equity in the Duchesne lot o|

12

five-hundred-fifty dollars, because that's what you say you

13

took it in for?and I'll award that to you so that you can

14

find it and have whatever value there is for that^

15

MR. BUGGER:

16

THE COURT:

If you can find it.
— i n the mobile trailer home, I find

17

that there is a present value equity of $7000rand going to

18

award that to the Defendant.

19

award to the Plaintiff. The siding company, sir, whatever

20

there was there you say is yours?so you're obligated for

21

whatever obligations there are arising out of it and I'll

22

award to you whatever tools of the trade and equipment there

23

may be that were yours for use rand you're entitled to get

24

them? if the Plaintiff has any of them, order that she turn

25

them over to the Defendant, including the tool press, bench

Furniture and fixtures I'll

1

saw, ladder and wheel barrow*

2

Since apparently neither side is certain that there

3

is a diamond ring, it's whereabouts, not going to make any

4

specific order on that unless it's determined where it is. I

5

don't know where it is. 1975 Cadillac going to award to the

6

Plaintiff, and as I figure it, that gives to the Plaintiff in

7

assets, $38,630.

8

Since the Defendant has%sold the truck, the Plymouth,

9

LeMans," I'll award him the proceeds of those sales;the thous-

10 -and dollars on the truck, the fifty dollars on the Plymouth,!
11

fifty dollars on the LeMansrvalue of the tools at $1,700,and

12

that comes to $10,350, including the mobile home and the Duch

13

-esne lot.

I think that the.obligation on the property of thfe

j

*» .* *

t4 marriage certainly ought to be shared up until the time the
15 1 parties split up?and so I am going to order that the payment
16

to Sears of $432 be split between the parties. Dr. Barnes is

17

to be split.

Don't have a figure on that.

18

MR. HANSEN:

19

THE COURT:

20

Fifty dollars, Your Honor.
' Fifty dollars? All right.

The

mobil

home, the $1,500 paid by the Plaintiff on that, to be split
J

i

21 I between the parties. The $744 to be split between the parties
22 | And the IRS lien, because the only evidence I have before-me
t

23 ! is apparently .those were obligations incurred during the marr
24 | -iage when both of you are working rand I can't identify as
25 j being the obligation oi one person only. - And so if I add

1

those figures together, that leaves one item that I

2 have not included here;I have some difficulty trying to figur^
3 out what it is;and that's the equity in the uniform real
4

estate contract*

It has nine years to go, for 12 months,

5 times $79* which means that there is $8,532 yet to be paid on
6

that.

But that would have to be discounted to it's current

7 value;in nine years, the interest would equal the principal.
8 Going to set the figure on that of $6000;just having to do it
9

arbitrarily*

If I put $6000 on that and award that to the

10 Defendant, the two parties then come out approximately equal.
11 Nineteen-thousand-thfee-huridred-fifteen dollars to the Plain>

12 -tiff; nineteen-thousand-eight** »

dollars to the Defendant.

13 And I think that's as near as I can divide the assets.
14

MR. HANSEN:

One point of Vitrification, Your

15 Honor. And now that I get your bottom figure here;I am assumf
16 -ing then that the award of the residence to the Plaintiff
17 would incorporate

the underlying first and second mortgage

18 obligation thereunder.
19

THE COURT:

I have taken, using $33;630 and value

20 of the property and $5000 for the Cadillac, makes a total of
21

thiiiy-eight-thousand-six-hundred-thirty dollars.

22 give no value to furniture and fixtures, because

I really
they're

23 valuable to tie person that has them, but can't sell them for
24 fifty bucks, a hundred bucks, whatever.
25

MR. HANSEN:

It would be, Your Honor, for my own

1

c l a r i f i c a t i o n then t h a t the award of t h e r e a l property,

2

t h a t ' s the Kearns property t o the P l a i n t i f f

3

assuming both underlying o b l i g a t i o n s ,

4

THE COURTs

Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t .

i s s u b j e c t t o herj

Cadillac,

furnit-

5

-ure and f i x t u r e s in the home would only be §6000.

6

i f I d i v i d e t h a t by two, g i v e him t h e Duchesne l o t , mobile

7

home and t h e t r u c k , and t h e Plymouth, LeMans, t h e t o o l s , u n i -

8

-form r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and one h a l f the debts t h a t have

9

been paid by her;and t h a t comes out t o h i s share § 1 9 , 0 1 8 . I

10
11
12
13

think t h a t d i f f e r e n c e i s t o o m i n i s c u l e t o bo ther w i t h .
MR. BUGGER:

How zm I go i n ' t o c o l l e c t on the

t o o l s when there a i n ' t any?
THE COURT:

They s o l d 'em a l l .

Sorry, c a n ' t answer t h a t q u e s t i o n .

14

Didn't c r e a t e t h i s s i t u a t i o n .

15

I have g o t .

16

§19,315,

MR KNOWLTON:

Doing the b e s t I can with what

Your Honor h a s awarded, a s I under

17

- s t a n d , the home out at Kearns t o g e t h e r with t h e f u r n i t u r e

13

t h e r e contained, t o the P l a i n t i f f ?and t h a t , as I heard Your

!9

Honor, was approximately §38,000

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. KNCWLTQN:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Uh-huh and t h e C a d i l l a c .
That would be § 4 3 , 0 0 0 .
No, § 3 3 , 6 3 5 f o r t h e home, §5000 f o r

t h e C a d i l l a c makes § 3 8 , 6 3 0 .
MR. KNOWLTCK:

My q u e s t i o n i s , you s a i d §19,000

t o the one;§19,000 t o the o t h e r .

How can we g e t §38,000 out

1

of $19,000 i t seems t o me t h a t under Your Honor's r u l e |

2

3

right.

THE COURT:

Wait a minute, you^re r i g h t .

You're r i g h t .

Wait a minute;got t o make another c a l f

4

-culation here.

5

t h a t he g e t s .

6

g o t t o subtract t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h o s e two.

7

another $4,311 in e q u i t y in the v a l u e of t h e home.

8
9

You're r i g h t .

I now come up with $19,018

And a s s e t s , she g e t s t h i r t y - e i g h t .

What I am doing i s taking $38,630

So I ' v e
Yes, he h^s

as t h e d i s t r i b u t e

- i o n t o Mrs. whatever—the d i s t r i b u t i o n t o the Defendant.

10

come out with $ 1 9 , 0 1 8 .

11

MR. KSJOWLTON:

12

THE COURTs

13

You're

Yes,

I|

sir.

And t h a t i n c l u d e s h a l f of the b i l l s

t h a t were incurred a f t e r the s e p a r a t i o n , except for the mort]
^*.

14

-gage payments?! think that inures to her benefit because

15

she has lived in the home during that time;and so I add thosj

16

together and I come out with $19,018;and for him. And $38,6JJG

17

if I subtract the $19,000 from the $38,630, that leaves me

18
19

eight-thousand-six-hundred-seventy -two dollars more that
she's getting than he. And if you divide that between them,

20

that would be $4,311 to him to even out.

21

even. You follow me?

22

MR. KNCWLTON:

So they come out

I don't believe I do, Your Honor.

23

Thirty-eight-thousand would be the equity that she would be

24

receiving.

25

THE COURT:

That's r i g h t .

1

MR. KNOWLTONs

2

THE COURTs

And t h e $19,000 from $38,000 i s
Maybe my f i g u r e s are wrong.

3

use my c a l c u l a t o r on t h a t one.

4

I am in t r o u b l e .

5
6

MR. KNOWLTONs

Didn't

I f I don't use my c a l c u l a t o r

Difference would be 17,000. Half

of 17,000.

7

THE COURTs

19,652, the difference, so X am in

8

error. $19,652

9

means $9,826 equity in the home that the Defendant should

10

13

Divide that by two and that

have.

11 I
12

difference.

Now, Mr. Hansen, have you followed my figures, I
hope?
MR.HANSENs

Well, Your Honor, I think so.

If I

14

can recap concerning the Plaintiffs

15

The Defendant's position we have taken $550 equity on the

16

Duchesne lot.

17

THE COURTs

pb'sition I have got.

Give them to you.

Duchesne lot, $550,]

18

mobile home, $7000, truck that was sold, $1000, '48 Plymouth

19

fifty dollars, '65 LeMans, $50. tools, $l",700r balance on un-j-

20

-iform real estate contract, $6000. Trying to take my best

21

guestimate of what that would be.

22

MR. HANSENs

23

THE COURTs

615350.
She has paid in o b l i g a t i o n s t h e IRS,

24 $2650, $423 t o somebody—I d o n ' t remember who i t i s , $ 1 , 3 0 0 ,
25 $744, which comes out t o $5,367 and charge him with h a l f of

1
2

that—is $ 2 6 , 8 3 . 5 0 .
I

MR. HANSEN:

3

Ok.

Come w i t h i n a few d o l l a r s of

that that arrives at his equity figure then.

4
5

So I add t o h i s the 2683.

THE COURT?
I

MR. HANSEN?

Ok.
From the Plaintiff $38,630, Your

6

Honor, that incorporates or encompasses the half of the bills

7

she has paid;I assumed, in other words the other 2683 that is

8

I in there.

9

I

THE COURT:

Taking the current balance on the

10

equity of the place. She has the advantage of living there

II

for whatever

it is, I considered that comparable to the rent

1* I -ting of the place during the same period a time. All right.
*3

Now, that means that on this kind of a division she
*•%

» «

14

J would s t i l l ewe him $9,&l0 as a l i e n on the hoine7>

15

|

16

I s o t h a t Your Honor w i l l understand our t h i n k i n g , I think we

17

| would be w i l l i n g t o offer her the switch and give her $10,000

MR. KNOWLTCN:

To make i t e q u i t a b l e . Your Honor,

*8 I from the sale of the home, that is»
19
MR. HANSEN:
X don.'t know that^ t h a t
20
21

MR. KNOWItfON:

o f f e r e d her and $10,000 for t h e s a l e of the home.

22
23

THE COURT:
you want.

24" now.

25

Give her everything t h a t t h e y ' v e

Well, you can work t h a t out any way

But my c a l c u l a t i o n s have gone as far as I can r i g h t

Now, I think t h a t with t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e home t h a t ' s

there, there ought to be a reasonable period to try t o s e l l i t

or pay the Defendant his equity*
you think that would be, Mr.Hansen?
MR. KNGWLTONs
THE COURT:

How much time do

Thirty days.
Oh no. Spring.

Mr. Hansen?

MR. ffi^NSEN: Your Honor, if I can have just a
moment to digest a little bit of this and consult with my cli
-ent, if I may?
THE COURTS
MR. HANSEN:

Give you thirty seconds.
Your Honor, we would ask the Court

that under the circumstances that we have,-we're in April,now
that is the 4th month?that we have 180 days to come up with
the money to satisfy that lien.
THE COURT:

Mr* Knowlton, what would you suggest?

MRe KNOWLTONs

Your Honor, calling the attention

of the Court to the fact that this is April, we're about to g
into May*

In our area the selling time is May and October.

We think, Your Hqnor, sixty days would be just right
And we think Your Honor should give some thought to whether oip
not there shouldn't be any
THE COURT:

Ok. Here is what I am going to do.

I am going to order that the Plaintiff have six months in
which to sell and pay to the Defendant the $9,826. The reasoji
I am doing it that way is because I am giving the Defendant
the income off from the uniform real estate contractrand that
if it is not sold within six months or the Defendant is paid

9

1

out and I donft care whether you sell it or pay him the)

2

$9,826?that the ammount will then accrue interest at the

E

legal rate, which is now 12 %•

4

property listed for sale byNmultiple listing real estate

And the Court will order the|

5 ) agency and sold for the best price*

And that after that

6

date, six months fr^^Jie date I sign the Order, on this, it

7

would accrue interest^at the rate of the legal rate of inter]

8

-est*

9

are called for under the Anullment Statute*

10
H
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

22
23
24
25

Not going to award attorneys fees*

Don't think they
Ok*

Good luck

to you, The Court will be in recess.
(WHEREUPON„%hi.3 hearing was concluded.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI.

&y»

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTED ^ Z 2 ^
STATE OF UTAH
WILMA Re BUGGER,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VS.

CIVIL NO. D-81-4371
CHARLES B. BUGGER,
Defendante

JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 19th
day of April, 1983, before the HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, one of the
Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury; and the
Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, Kenn M.
Hansen, and the Defendant

appearing

in person and with his

attorney, Horace J. Knowlton; and it having been shown to the Court
that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of the Complaint and
a copy of- the Summons, and wherein the Defendant having answered
same within the allotted time by statute, and the testimony of the
parties having been heard in open Court, and the Court having been
fully informed in the premises, hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Plaintiff is now and for more than three (3)

months last past has been an actual bona fide resident of the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 1

2.

That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a purported

marriage contract on the 10th day of June, 1946, in Las Vegas,
State of Nevada, and ever since said time have been and now are
husband and wife.
3.

That at the time Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the

purported marriage contract, Plaintiff was married to another
person. That the Plaintiff failed to advise the Defendant that she
in fact was a married woman at the time of her marriage to the
Defendant herein.
4.

That the assets of the marriage should be divided as

follows:
a.

That the Plaintiff should be awarded the home and

real property located at 4098 West 5500 South in Kearns, Utah,
and described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 7 Blk 69 Hoffman Heights No. 11 in the
City of Kearns, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah,
together

will

all

household

furniture, furnishings

and

effects, plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
b.

That the Defendant should be awarded the real

property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the mobile home; his
siding company and tools; his truck; and the proceeds from the
Uniform Real Estate contract.
c.

That the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the

Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6)
months after the date of the signing of the Decree of
Annulment.

That after said six (6) months, in the event the

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 2

Plaintiff fails to pay to the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00,
then the Court shall sell the home and the Defendant be paid
said $9,862*00, plus interest to accrue at the legal rate of
12%.
d.
proceeds

Further that the Defendant should be awarded the
from the sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans

automobiles, which sums are now in Defendant's possession.
e.

That the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the

Defendant the sum of $1,700.00, as and for the siding tools
which she sold during said marriage.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant be granted a Decree of

Annulment, same to become final upon the signing and entry.
2.

That the Plaintiff be awarded the following real and

personal property as her sole and separate property and estate, towit: the home and real property located at 4098 West 5500 South in
Kearns, Utah, and described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 7 Blk 69 Hoffman Heights No. 11 in the
City of Kearns, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, in Kearns, Utah,
together will all household furniture, furnishings and effects,
plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
3.

That the Defendant be awarded the following real and

personal property as his sole and separate property and estate, towit: the real property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the mobile
home; his siding company and tools; his truck; and the proceeds
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3

from the Uniform Real Estate contract, and the proceeds from the
sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans automobiles, which sums are now
in Defendant's possession.
4*

Further that the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to

the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6)
months after the date of the signing of the Decree of Annulment.
That after said six (6) months, in the event the Plaintiff fails to
pay to the Defendant the sura of $9,862.00, then the Court shall
sell the home and the Defendant be paid said $9,862.00, plus
interest to accrue at the legal rate of 12%, plus the sum of
$1,700.00, as and for the siding tools which she sold during said
marriage.
DATED this .19th day of April, 1983.

J O I J T Y COURT CEFU
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILMA R. BUGGER,
Plaintiff,

)
]l

AMENDED
DECREE OF ANNULMENT

1

CIVIL NO. D-81-4371

;I

JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER

CHARLES B. BUGGER,
Defendant.

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 19th
day of April, 1983, before the HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, one of the
Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, and the
Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, Kenn M.
Hansen,

and the Defendant

appearing

in person

and with his

attorney, Horace J. Knowlton; and it having been shown to the Court
that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of the Complaint and
a copy of the Summons, and wherein the Defendant having answered
same within the allotted time by statute, and the testimony of the
parties having been heard in open Court, and the Court having been
fully informed in the premises, hereby makes the following:

AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT - 1

ORDER
1«

That the Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby granted to a

Decree of Annulment, same to become final upon the signing and
entry«
2.

That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the following real

and personal property as her sole and separate property and estate,
to-wit: the home and real property located at 4098 West 5500 South
in Kearns, Utah, described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 7 Blk 69 Hoffman Heights No. 11 in the
City of Kearns, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah,
together will all household furniture, furnishings and effects,
plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
3.

That the Defendant is hereby awarded the following real

and personal property as his sole and separate property and estate,
to-wit:

the real property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the

mobile home; his siding company and tools; his truck; the proceeds
from the Uniform Real Estate contract; and the proceeds from the
sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans automobiles, which sums are now
in Defendant's possession.
4.

Further that the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to

the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6)
months after the date of the signing of this Decree of Annulment.
That after said six (6) months, in the event the Plaintiff fails to
pay to the Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, then the Court shall
sell the home in Kearns, Utah, described as follows, to-wit:
AMENDED DECREE OF ANNULMENT - 2

ORDER
1.

That the Plaintiff a £ Defendant are hereby granted to a

Decree of Annulment, same to become ^final upon the signing and
entry•
2e

That the.Plaintiff is hereby awarded the following real

and personal property as her sole and separate property and estate,
to-wit:

the home and real property located in Kearns, Utah,

together will all household furniture, furnishings and effects,
plus the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
3.

That the Defendant is hereby awarded the following real

and personal property as his sole and separate property and estate,
to-wit:

the real property located a Duchesne County, Utah; the

mobile home; his siding company and tools; his truck; the proceeds
from the Uniform Real Estate contract; and the proceeds from the
sale of the Plymouth and the LeMans automobiles, which sums are now
in Defendant's possession.
4.

That the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to the

Defendant the sum of $9,862.00, same to be paid within six (6)
months after the date of the signing of the* Decree of Annulment,
plus interest to accrue at the legal rate of 12%, and the sum of
$1,700.00, as and for the siding tools which she sold during said
marriage.
DATED this 19th day of April, 1983.

?1MICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
WILMA R. BUGGER,

FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC)

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. D-81-4371

CHARLES B, BUGGER,

Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant

Commissioner Atherton/Peuler
oooOooo

A trial on this matter came on for hearing and resolution on the 19th day of April,
1983, before the Honorable Dean Conder, District Court Judge presiding. The Plaintiff
appeared personally and through her attorney, Kenn M. Hanson; the Defendant appeared
personally and through his attorney, Horace J. Knowlton. The Court heard and considered
the parties' testimony as proffered by their respective attorneys of record and further
considered the evidence to be presented, and being fully advised in the premises and good
cause appearing thereon, the Court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both the Plaintiff and Defendant are now and for at least three (3) months

immediately before the filing of this action have been residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.

(intfn

2.

The parties were purportedly married on June 10, 1946, in Las Vegas,

Nevada. However, at that time of said marriage the Plaintiffs interlocutory period from
a prior divorce had not yet expired thereby rendering the marriage ceremony to the named
Defendant in their action as void.
3.

During the course of the parties' relationship, seven (7) children were born

as issue of the alleged marriage all of whom have attained the age of majority and none
are in need of any financial support
4.

During the course of their relationship the parties have acquired certain real

property presently situated at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah, consisting of a house
and lot. Said real property is titled solely in the name of the Plaintiff. The fair market
value of said real property is determined to be $47,000.00.
5.

There exists an underlying 1st mortgage on said real property in the amount

of $5,63331; there also exists an underlying 2nd mortgage on said real property in the
amount of $8,236.10.
6.

Based thereon, the total present equity in the real property is in the sum of

$33,630.77.
7.

During the course of the parties's relationship, the parties acquired a cabin

lot located in Duchesne County, Utah. The fair market value of said real property is
determined to be $550.00.
8.

During the course of the parties' relationship, the parties acquired a 12' x 60'

mobile home. The fair market value of said mobile home is determined to be $7,000.00.
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9.

During their relationship the parties acquired certain motor vehicles

described as follows with corresponding values determined by the Court:
Description

Value

a.

1975 Cadillac automobile

$5,000.00

b.

Mercury automobile

c.

Panel truck

d.

1948 Plymouth

e.

1965 Pontiac

10.

During the course of the relationship, the parties acquired the proceeds of

100.00
1,000.00
50.00
50.00

a-Uniform Real Estate Contract on a principal sum of $7,800.00 at 9% interest per annum
for 15 years paying $79.11 per month. Said contract has 9 years on its terms and the
present value of said note is $6,000.00
11.

During the course of the relationship, the Defendant has acquired various

tools of his trade which have a present fair market value of $1,700.00.
12.

During the course of the relationship, the parties incurred various obligations

set forth below with corresponding approximate balances which have been paid by Plaintiff
and for which she is entitled to a contribution towards:
Creditor

Balance

a.

Sears

$ 423.00

b.

Dr. Regal

c.

Mobile Home

1,500.00

d.

Credit Union

744.00

50.00

-3-

C0120

e.

IRS lien

2,650.00

13.

During the course of the relationship, the Defendant incurred certain debts

in the name of his business, B&B Siding, some of which are as follows:
a.

Century Finance Company;

b.

Valley Bank & Trust;

c-

VISA; and

&

Texaco.

14.

It is fair and reasonable that the real property located at 4098 West 5500

South, Kearns, Utah, be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff assuming and paying
the underlying 1st and 2nd mortgages thereon, and, further, subject to an equitable hen
in favor of Defendant in the amount of $9,796.00.
15.

It is fair and reasonable that the Plaintiff pay to Defendant the amount of

an equitable lien as follows:
a.

Plaintiff shall have 180 days from entry of the Decree to pay to Defendant

the amount of $9,796.00.
b.

In the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant $9,796.00 upon the expiration

of 180 days from the entry of the Decree, said amount of Defendant's lien shall
accrue interest on the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid.
c.

Further, upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the Decree and

in the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant the amount of Defendant's hen, the
above-referenced real property shall be listed for sale through a multiple listing
agency and sold for the best price.
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16.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded as his sole and separate

property the cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah, subject to any and all underlying
obUgations thereon0
17.

It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property the 12s x 60' mobile home subject to any and all underlying obligations
thereon.
18.

It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property the proceeds of a Uniform Real Estate contract amounting to $79.11 per
month until said payments terminate according to the terms and provisions of said
contract.
19.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and separate

property the fixtures, furniture and personal property located within the real property at
4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah.
20.

It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be ordered to assume and pay,

holding the Plaintiff harmless from any liability thereon, the debts and obUgations arising
from the Defendant's company known as B&B Siding Co., some of which are listed as
foUows:
a.

Century Finance

b.

VaUey Bank & Trust

c.

VISA

d.

Texaco

-5-
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21.

It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property the proceeds from the sale of the following automobiles:
a*

The B&B Siding panel truck

b.

1948 Plymouth automobile

c.

1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile

d.

the Mercury automobile.

22.

It is fair and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and

separate property the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
23.

It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property the tools of his trade that remain in Plaintiffs possession.
24.

It is fair and reasonable that the Defendant be ordered to pay and assume

one-half of the bills owing to:
a.

Sears

b.

Dr. Regal

c.

payments on the mobile home

d.

personal loan

e.

IRS lien

25.

It is fair and reasonable that each party be ordered to assume and pay their

respective attorney's fees and costs in maintaining this action.
WHEREFORE, the Court, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of
Fact, now makes and enters the following:

-6-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to this case and the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this type of action.
2.

There exists grounds legally sufficient to grant a Decree of Annulment

declaring said marriage between the parties to be void ab initio.
3.

There exists legally insufficient grounds to award any attorney's fees to either

party and each should bear their own costs and expenses in this matter,
4.

The Decree of Annulment should be in conformance with the foregoing

Findings of Fact.
5.

Pursuant to the trial held on April 19, 1994, the findings of fact and

conclusions of law of the Court are sjitered NUNC PRO TUNC.

3

DATED this _

day of

Approved as to Form:

David Brown
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HOME:
Fair Market Value
1st mortgage: $5,633.13
2nd mortgage: $8,236.00

$47,500.00
-13.869.23
$33.630.77

TOTAL EQUITY:
PLAINTIFFS EQUITY:
a. Real Property
b. Cadillac

$33,630.00
5.000.00

Plaintiffs GROSS equity:
LESS Defendant's lien:

38,630.00
9,796.00

PLAINTIFFS NET EQUITY:

mmm

DEFENDANTS EQUITY:
a. Duchesne property
b. UREC
c. Trailer
d. l/2 of debts
e. Defendant's tools
g. Car proceeds

$ 550.00
6,000.00
7,000.00
2,688.00
1,700.00
UQQ.OQ

Defendant's GROSS equity:
PLUS Defendant's lien:

$19,038.00
9.796.00

DEFENDANTS TOTAL EOUITY$28.834.00
COMPUTATION OF DEFENDANTS LIEN:
Plaintiffs GROSS equity:

$38,630.00

Less Defendant's GROSS equity: -19.038.00
Difference

$19.592.00

$19,592.00 divided by 2 = $9,796.00 (Defendant's lien)
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
the following:
David Brown, Esq.
#9 Exchange Place #1120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 10th day of May, 1994.

BUGG-CON.LAW

"
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W. KEVIN JACKSON (1640)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379
Telephones (801) 531-6600
Faxs (801) 521-3731
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DECREE OF ANNULMENT
(ENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC)

WILMA R. BUGGER,
Plaintiff,
vs6

Case No. D-81-4371

CHARLES B. BUGGER,

Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

Commissioner Atherton/Peuler
oooOooo

A trial on this matter came on for hearing and resolution on
the 19th day of April, 1983, before the Honorable Dean Conder,
District Court Judge.

Plaintiff appeared personally and through

her attorney, Kenn M. Hanson; the Defendant appeared personally
and through his attorney, Horace J. Knowlton. The Court heard and
considered the parties' testimony as proffered by their respective
attorneys and further considered the evidence to be presented, and
being fully advised in the premise sand good cause appearing
thereon, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant

is hereby granted

a Decree of Annulment

declaring the parties marriage void ab initio and of no legal
force or effect.
2.

The real property located at 4098 West 5500 South,

Kearns, Utah, is hereby awarded to Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff
assuming and paying the underlying 1st and 2nd mortgages thereon,

and, further, subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendant
in the amount of $9,796*00 and which shall be extinguished by the
Court's ruling on the Defendant's Order to Show Cause and the
trial on the same held on April 19, 1994.
3e

The Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant the amount of the

equitable lien as follows?
a-

The Plaintiff shall have 180 days from entry of the

Decree of Annulment to pay to Defendant the amount of
$9,796cQ0.
b*

In the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant $9,796.00

upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the Decree,
said amount of Defendant's lien shall accrue interest on the
principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid,
c*

Further, upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry

of the Decree and in the event Plaintiff has not paid
Defendant

the

amount

of

Defendant's

lien,

the

above-

referenced real property shall be listed for sale through a
multiple listing agency and sold for the best price.
4.

The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate

property the cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah, subject
to any and all underlying obligations thereon.
5.

The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate

property the 12' x 60' mobile home subject to any and all
underlying obligations thereon.
6.

The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate

property the proceeds of a Uniform Real Estate Contract amounting
-2-

to $79.11 per month until said payments terminate according to the
terms and provisions of said contract.
7c

The Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate

property the fixtures, furniture and personally located within the
real property at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah.
8.

The Defendant is hereby ordered to assume and pay,

holding the Plaintiff harmless from any liability thereon, all of
the debts and obligations arising from the Defendant's company
known as B&B Siding•
9.

The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate

property the proceeds from the sale of the following automobiles:
a.

The B&B Siding panel truck

b.

1948 Plymouth automobile

c.

1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile

do

the Mercury automobile.

10.

The Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate

property the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
11.

The Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate

property the tools of his trade that remain in Plaintiff's
possession.
12.

The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay and assume one-

half of the bills owing to:
a.

Sears

b.

Dr. Regal

c.

payments on the mobile home

d.

personal loan

-3-

e.

The IRS lien obligation

13.

Each party is ordered to assume and pay their respective

attorney's fees and costs in maintaining this action.
14 c Pursuant to the hearing and trial conducted by the Court
on April 19, 1994, the above orders and decrees are hereby entered
and shall be deemed effective from the 19th day of April, 1983 and
they are hereby entered NUNC PRO TUNC.
DATED this _

day of

, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE TYRONE MEDLEY
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

h AVID

BROWN
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to the following:
David Brown, Esq#9 Exchange Place #1120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by placiner the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
this irr& day of
MOM
199^.

BOGG-DBC.AMX.
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